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Abstract
We develop a theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers
interact. The platform may be owned by a single large, or many small independent or
vertically integrated intermediaries. We provide a positive and normative analysis of the
impact of platform ownership structure on platform size. The strength of network eﬀects
is important in the ranking of ownership structures by induced platform size and welfare.
While vertical integration may be welfare-enhancing if network eﬀects are weak, monopoly
platform ownership is socially preferred if they are strong.
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Most markets do not form spontaneously, but need to be organized. In a market place which
may be a physical or virtual location, buyers and sellers interact on what we call a trading
platform. Examples of market places in physical location are abundant in economic geography.
An example of a market place in virtual location is the internet platform. The interesting central
feature common to many market places are two-sided network eﬀects: buyers are attracted to
market places or platforms that house many sellers; sellers are attracted to market places that
draw many buyers. The size of the trading platform reﬂects the number of sellers it houses: a
larger number of sellers need a larger platform.
We observe widely diﬀering institutional arrangements or ownership structures of platforms.
The platform may be owned by a monopoly intermediary, by many small intermediaries, or
by buyers or sellers active on the platform. Dispersed platform ownership may further be
distinguished by contractual arrangements and property rights: incumbent platform owners
may or may not have the right to restrict entry onto the platform. Examples of monopoly
platform ownership are shopping malls controlled by a single developer, and independently-
owned internet and software platforms. Also, large supermarket chains (such as Walmart) and
department stores (such as Harrods) act as monopoly platforms to the extent that they delegate
pricing to the manufacturers and charge them for the provision of retail space. An example of
dispersed ownership with unrestricted access is the retail space supplied by landlords within a
downtown shopping district. But zoning laws may restrict the development of new slots, and
so the city council may play the role of a public platform holder. If the city council is captured
by the interests of incumbent property owners, the shopping district may be viewed as a closed
platform in which owners of developed slots can block the development of additional slots
for commercial purposes. A virtual location example of dispersed ownership with restricted
access is the New York Stock Exchange where the seat holders form a club that controls entry.
Here, the companies listing their stocks correspond to the sellers on the platform, and the
investors correspond to the buyers.1 Finally, we observe many variants of vertically-integrated
platforms such as B2B electronic marketplaces. For example, Covisint is owned by downstream
automotive manufacturers, and Supply-On by their upstream suppliers.
In recent years, antitrust authorities in the U.S. and Europe have become increasingly
concerned about potential anticompetitive practices in such market places. Indeed, it is the
presence of two-sided network eﬀects that raises doubts about the validity of received antitrust
guidelines. For example, the welfare consequences of a dominant platform owned by a single
company have been central to recent antitrust investigations in the case of Microsoft’s Windows
operating system. Another recent example is the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s investigation
of Covisint.2 Similarly, the European Commission recently investigated conditions of access to
airport slots in the context of mergers and alliances in the airline industry.3
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework of trade on a platform, in which we avoid
1Companies have to pay an initial listing fee and an annual renewal certiﬁcation fee. Resulting revenues are
linearly distributed among seat holders according to the number of seats.
2See FTC press release on September 11, 2000.
3See, for example, “Competition Policy in the Air Transport Sector”, speech by EU Commissioner Karel van
Miert, given to the Royal Aeronautic Society in 1998.
1making functional form assumptions and allow for both, dispersed, or horizontally or vertically
integrated ownership structures. Our framework is suﬃciently rich to encompass as special
cases a number of existing models of intermediated and non-intermediated trade, with very
diﬀerent micro foundations.
We apply this framework to address two sets of questions. (1) What is the impact of
ownership structure on platform size or, equivalently, on the number of varieties oﬀered by
sellers? Does monopoly platform ownership lead to more or less product diversity than a
platform owned by a large number of small intermediaries? How does the platform’s ability to
charge not only sellers but also buyers for access aﬀect platform size under diﬀerent ownership
structures? What is the eﬀect of vertical integration on platform size? How do these answers
depend on the strength of platform externalities? (2) From a social point of view, does the
“market” over- or underprovide product variety? How does this depend on the ownership
structure and on the ability of the platform to charge not only sellers but also buyers? Are
monopoly intermediation or vertical integration necessarily harmful for welfare? What are
the welfare eﬀects of allowing incumbent intermediaries to exclude potential entrants from the
platform? More generally, which ownership structure is socially preferred?
In our model, we consider a market in which buyers and sellers interact exclusively on one
trading platform. A large number of heterogeneous sellers each rent a platform slot to sell a
diﬀerentiated product. The platform slots are let by either a large number of intermediaries
or by a monopoly platform owner. A large number of heterogeneous buyers decide whether
or not to visit the platform to purchase the products oﬀered by the sellers.4 Network eﬀects
are two-sided: the larger the number of sellers (i.e., the greater the product variety), the more
attractive is the platform to buyers; and vice versa, for a given platform size, the larger the
number of buyers, the more attractive it is for sellers to rent a platform slot. The basic platform
ownership structures we consider are: two modes of competitive ownership, namely an open
access platform and a closed platform or club, where access is restricted by the incumbent
intermediaries; and monopoly platform ownership. We extend this model in two directions.
First, we analyze vertically integrated platform ownership where each platform slot is owned
by one seller, and access to the platform may be either open or closed. Second, we consider
two-sided pricing where platform owners charge not only sellers but also buyers for access.
Our model is suﬃciently rich to address some major competition policy concerns. One
concern is that the downward integration of sellers onto a platform would give rise to undue
restrictions on the size of a platform. However, this concern is misplaced in the context of our
model where vertical integration of sellers onto the platform is weakly welfare-improving.
Another concern by policy-makers is that incumbent platform owners may impose undue
restrictions on new entrants. In the context of our model, this is indeed a valid concern. But
allowing incumbents to restrict access may actually increase welfare if platform eﬀects are weak.
Yet another concern is that giving market power to a monopoly platform owner would
lead to high rental charges, and thus drive down seller proﬁts. Under free entry of sellers,
this would induce a smaller platform size than an open platform ownership. This intuition
is correct only if platform eﬀects are weak. If platform eﬀects are strong, on the other hand,
4A zero access price applies to consumers if it is not feasible to charge buyers or if the platform would choose
to subsidize buyers but can only set non-negative access prices. The latter situation is likely to occur in an
extended model with two platforms provided that sellers multi-home and buyers single-home.
2monopoly ownership induces a larger platform size and is socially preferable to other ownership
structures. But even if platform eﬀects are weak, monopolization can be socially desirable as
an open ownership structure can induce a socially excessive platform size.
Our analysis thus indicates that competition policy in two-sided markets should be aware of
some important aspects. First, allowing sellers to integrate downwards onto the platform may
be socially beneﬁcial, in particular under closed ownership and weak platform eﬀects. Second,
allowing incumbent intermediaries to exclude potential entrants has ambiguous welfare eﬀects
if platform eﬀects are weak, and has no eﬀects otherwise. Third, monopoly platform ownership
is socially preferable to fragmented ownership if platform eﬀects are strong and possibly even
if they are weak.
Related Literature. Our model is related to several strands of the literature. What sets
our paper apart from the existing literature, however, is our focus on the eﬀect of platform
ownership structure, and the strength of the platform eﬀects, on trade.
First, our paper is closely related to the recent literature on two-sided markets (e.g., Rochet
and Tirole, 2003 and 2006; Armstrong, 2006), which builds on the older literature on network
eﬀects in non-intermediated trade (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985) and, in particular, on indirect
network eﬀects (e.g., Chou and Shy, 1990; Church, Gandal, and Krause, 2002). As in our
model, there are two-sided network eﬀects on the trading platform: buyers care about the
number of sellers, and sellers care about the number of buyers. In this literature, it is typically
assumed that sellers do not compete with each other for buyers and that buyers and sellers
are charged for access and usage of the platform.5 The objective of much of this literature is
to analyze the pricing structure on both sides of the market when the platform is owned by a
single owner, while our objective is to analyze platform size and product variety on a platform
for diﬀerent ownership structures.
Second, our paper is closely related to the literature on optimal product diversity (e.g.,
Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and on optimal entry (e.g., von Weizsäcker, 1980;
Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987). At the heart of this literature
lies the question whether the market over- or underprovides product variety or the number
of sellers. The literature diﬀers from our paper in that there is no intermediated trade, and
typically there are no indirect network eﬀects.
Third, our paper is also related to the literature on geographical market places (e.g., Stahl,
1982; Schulz and Stahl, 1996; Legros and Stahl, 2002). While the focus of this literature is
diﬀerent from that of our paper, the models may be interpreted as special cases of our general
framework with non-intermediated trade.
Fourth, our paper is loosely connected to the literature on intermediation (e.g., Spulber,
1999), which is concerned with explaining the emergence and role of intermediaries. In contrast,
we take the existence of a trading platform as given and focus on the eﬀect of ownership
5Baye and Morgan (2001) analyze a model of a monopoly gatekeeper in the internet, with pricing on both
sides of the market. Anderson and Coate (2005) analyze pricing of advertisements on a media platform, and
allow in most of their analysis for pricing on only one side of the market. They show that there may be over- or
underprovision of advertising from a social point of view. Rysman (2004) structurally estimates a related model
of the market for yellow pages, where pricing is again only on one side of the market. Few other papers have
looked at imperfect competition among sellers; exceptions are Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde (2004) or Hagiu
(2004). (See also footnote 6.) Only Hagiu (2004), following our approach, considers the possibility that the
platform may not be under monopoly ownership.
3structure of the platform.
Plan of the Paper. In the next section, we present our theoretical framework of trade on
a platform. In section 3, we analyze equilibrium and welfare under the three basic ownership
structures. In section 4, we provide a positive and normative analysis of vertically integrated
ownership structures. In section 5, we re-consider the equilibrium under the basic ownership
structures when platform owners can charge not only sellers but also buyers for accessing the
platform. In section 6, we discuss re-interpretations and extensions of our model. We conclude
in section 7.
2 A Model of Trading on a Platform
We consider a model of trading on one platform. There are three types of economic agents:
sellers, buyers, and intermediaries who own the trading platform. To oﬀer her good to buyers,
each seller needs to rent a slot on the platform. The rental charge of any given slot is determined
by its owner (intermediary). We allow for various ownership structures of the trading platform,
w h i c ha r ed e s c r i b e di nd e t a i li ns e c t i o n s3a n d4 .
Buyers. There is a continuum of (atomless) buyers who decide whether or not to visit the
platform. A buyer’s type is denoted by ζ; the empirical support of ζ in the population of buyers
is [0,∞). If a buyer of type ζ takes up the outside option, he obtains a utility of g(ζ). If instead
he decides to visit the market place, he derives a utility u(ms) ≥ 0,w h e r ems is the measure
of sellers on the platform. (Alternatively, we may assume that the value of the outside option
is zero for all types, and g(ζ) is the “transport cost” of visiting the platform.) We assume that
u(·) is a continuously diﬀerentiable function, and g(·) continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
increasing with g(ζ) →∞as ζ →∞ . The properties of g(·) ensure existence of a marginal
type z(ms) ≡ g−1(u(ms)) such that a buyer of type ζ visits the market place if and only if ζ ≤
z(ms).S i n c eg(·) can always be chosen appropriately, we assume w.l.o.g. that, for any x>0,
the measure of buyers whose types fall into the interval [0,x] is given by x.
Sellers. There is a continuum of (atomless) sellers who decide whether or not to rent a
platform slot.6 A seller’s type is denoted by µs; the empirical support of µs in the population
of sellers is [0,∞). If a seller decides not to participate on the platform, she obtains a zero
payoﬀ. Otherwise, she needs to rent a platform slot at rental price r.7 As e l l e ro ft y p eµs then
has to incur a setup cost of f(µs). A seller’s gross proﬁt per unit mass of buyers is given by
π(ms),w h e r ems is the measure of entering sellers. Further, since all buyers (who decide to visit
the market place) have identical demand, a seller’s variable proﬁt is proportional to the mass
z(ms) of buyers visiting the market place. We assume that π(·) is a continuously diﬀerentiable
function, and f(·) continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing with f(µs) →∞as µs →
∞.S i n c ef(·) can always be chosen appropriately, we assume w.l.o.g. that, for any x>0,t h e
measure of potential sellers whose types fall into the interval [0,x] is x.
6Our reduced-form approach in principle allows for large oligopoly sellers. In this case, the number of sellers is
discrete, and so a formal analysis would require taking into account integer constraints (and potential multiplicity
of equilibria). The qualitative features of our results carry over to the discrete setting.
7The (uniform) rental price r is thus the membership fee that each seller has to pay to obtain access to the
platform. Once access is granted, there are no further fees. See Rochet and Tirole (2006) for a discussion of the
reasons for the exclusive use of membership fees.
4We will refer to z(ms)π(ms)−f(µs) as the proﬁto fas e l l e ro ft y p eµs,a n dt oz(ms)π(ms)−
f(µs)−r as her net proﬁt. Optimal entry decisions imply existence of a marginal type ms such
that a seller rents a platform slot if and only if µs ≤ ms. Hence, the measure ms of entering
sellers is implicitly deﬁned by z(ms)π(ms) − f(ms) − r =0 .
The Platform. There is a continuum of (atomless) slots on the platform which can be
developed by their owners to host sellers. A slot type is denoted by µp; the empirical support
of µp is [0,∞). If its owner decides to develop a slot of type µp,h eh a st oi n c u raﬁxed cost
c(µp). Under each ownership structure, platform owners will ﬁrst develop the slots with the
lowest development costs. We assume that c(·) is a continuous and weakly increasing function:
it becomes increasingly costly to oﬀer the same services or convenience to buyers as more
retailers are active on the platform. Since c(·) can always be chosen appropriately, we assume
w.l.o.g. that, for any x>0, the measure of platform slots with types in [0,x] is x.F o r
simplicity, each platform slot hosts one seller, and so sellers of measure ms need retail space
of measure mp = ms. Retail space of measure mp is provided at a minimum development
cost of C(mp) ≡
R mp
0 c(µp)dµp.S i n c e c(·) is weakly increasing, C(·) is weakly convex. Note
that platform slots diﬀer only in their development costs; from the sellers’ point of view, all
developed slots are homogeneous. Consequently, the equilibrium rental price is independent of
t h et y p eo ft h es l o t .
Market Clearing. Under any ownership structure, the rental market for platform slots
will clear in equilibrium. Since a single slot accommodates a single seller, in equilibrium, the
measure of entering sellers must be equal to the measure of developed platform slots, i.e.,
ms = mp = m. We will refer to m as the platform size.
Payoﬀs. To summarize, we can write the equilibrium payoﬀ of a seller of type µs as
z(m)π(m)−f(µs)−r,w h e r em is the equilibrium platform size and r the (uniform) equilibrium
rental price. Below we will often refer to the marginal seller’s proﬁt (gross of the rental price
r) which is denoted by Φ(m) ≡ z(m)π(m) − f(m). The equilibrium surplus of a buyer of
type ζ from visiting the platform (rather than taking up the outside option) is u(m) − g(ζ).
Aggregate proﬁts for intermediaries are the revenues collected through rental charges, mr,
minus the accumulated platform development costs C(m).
Timing. We consider the following sequence of decisions, involving ﬁrst the intermediaries,
then the sellers, and ﬁnally the buyers:8
Stage 1a The measure mp of platform slots is developed by their owner(s).
Stage 1b The rental charge r is set by the platform owners (intermediaries).
Stage 2 Sellers decide whether or not to rent a slot on the trading platform.
Stage 3 Buyers decide whether or not to visit the platform.
Underlying Micro Structure. While not necessary for our formal analysis, it is helpful
to consider the micro structure we have in mind. Each seller oﬀers a unique variety of a
diﬀerentiated good, and hence faces a downward-sloping residual demand curve. Varieties are
8Throughout the paper, we focus on the equilibrium with the largest number of active sellers in each stage-2
subgame.
5symmetric, and so the platform size m is the measure of varieties oﬀered by sellers. We expect
a seller’s gross proﬁt (per unit mass of buyers), π(m), to (eventually) decrease with m for two
reasons. First, for given prices, buyers purchase less from each seller as the number of sellers
increases.9 This may be dubbed the market share eﬀect. Second, as the number of sellers
increases, competition becomes more intense and prices fall (assuming that the goods oﬀered
by sellers are substitutes). This may be dubbed the price eﬀect.10 The competition eﬀect is
then deﬁned as the sum of the market share and price eﬀects. It constitutes a negative direct
network eﬀect in the reduced form.
Likewise, buyers’ utility u(m) and, hence, the mass z(m) of buyers visiting the platform,
should be increasing in variety m for two reasons. First, buyers have a taste for variety. Second,
as the number of sellers increases, prices tend to fall (provided varieties are substitutes). The
eﬀect of an increase in m on the mass z(m) of buyers may be dubbed the market expansion
eﬀect. It constitutes a positive indirect network eﬀect in the reduced form.
If varieties are substitutes, an increase in platform size thus exercises two countervailing
forces on a seller’s variable proﬁt z(m)π(m): a positive market expansion eﬀect and a negative
competition eﬀect.11 The following example provides one particular micro-foundation for our
general model. We will return to it at various points in the paper.
Example 1 (CES) Suppose consumers (buyers) make a discrete choice between visiting the
market place and an outside option. Consumer type ζ’s value of the outside option or, equiva-
lently, the transport cost associated with visiting the platform, is given by g(ζ)=tζ. Conditional
on visiting the market place, consumers have CES preferences over the variants oﬀered by the











where p(j) is the price of variant j, E is income spent on the diﬀerentiated goods industry, and
ρ ∈ (0,1) is inversely related to the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Each retailer j maximizes
her gross proﬁt( p e ru n i tm a s so fb u y e r s )π =( p − c)p
− 1
1−ρA,w h e r ec is the marginal cost of





1−ρdj. Using symmetry, the ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt
maximization yield the equilibrium price p = c/ρ. I nt h i se x a m p l e ,a ni n c r e a s ei np r o d u c t
9There may be a countervailing eﬀect as variety increases, however, namely that variety-seeking consumers
may optimally decide to spend a larger fraction of their income on the goods produced in the diﬀerentiated
goods industry.
10If the goods oﬀered were complements, or alternatively, search o rp a r t i c i p a t i o ne x t e r n a l i t i e sw o u l dl e a dt o
demand complementarities, the price eﬀect would be positive, at least initially.
11In much of the literature on optimal product variety (e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), which is concerned with
non-intermediated trade, it is assumed that the number of active buyers is exogenous, and so z is a constant.
Yet there is competition between ﬁrms, and so π is decreasing in m.
In contrast, throughout much of the recent literature on two-sided markets (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003;
Armstrong, 2006), it is assumed that there is no competition eﬀect, and so π is a constant, while buyer surplus
depends on the number of sellers, and so z is not constant.
An exception is the recent work on the credit card payment industry, which provides a formal analysis of the
functioning of Visa and Mastercard; see Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Schmalensee (2002). Other exceptions
include Ambrus and Argenziano (2004), Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde (2004), and Hagiu (2004).
6variety has no price eﬀect, so ∂p/∂m =0 . Equilibrium output per seller is given by (E/m)(ρ/c),
s ot h e r ei sam a r k e ts h a r ee ﬀect, and π(m)=( 1− ρ)E/m is decreasing in m. In equilibrium,
utility u(m)=E(ρ/c)m
1−ρ
ρ is increasing in m. The marginal consumer z who is indiﬀerent
between visiting the market place and taking up the outside option is deﬁned by u(m)−tz =0 ,









Here, z(·)π(·) is monotone in m: it is decreasing if the variants are suﬃciently good substitutes,
ρ>1/2, and increasing if the reverse inequality holds. Hence, a necessary condition for an
interior maximum in the mass of entering sellers is that ρ<1/2.
As regards costs, we assume that sellers’ ﬁxed costs take the form f(µs)=aµb
s,w h e r e
a ≥ 0,b > 0; and that the development cost function takes the form c(µp)=αµ
β
p,w h e r e
α ≥ 0,β>0.
Reduced-Form Assumptions. Our discussion of the underlying micro-structure motivates
the following assumptions on the reduced-form payoﬀ functions.
Assumption 1 The marginal seller’s proﬁt Φ(m) ≡ z(m)π(m)−f(m) is single-peaked. Specif-
ically, there exists a unique b m ∈ [0,∞) ∪ {∞} such that Φ(·) is strictly increasing on [0, b m)
and strictly decreasing on (b m,∞).
If 0 < b m<∞, the maximizer is implicitly deﬁn e db yt h eﬁrst-order condition
Φ0(b m)=0 . (1)
In this case, the seller’s gross proﬁt z(m)π(m) initially rises faster with platform size than the
ﬁxed cost f(m), which can occur only if the market expansion eﬀect initially outweighs the
competition eﬀect. As m increases, one would expect the market expansion and competition
eﬀects to become smaller while less and less eﬃcient sellers enter the platform so that eventually
the marginal seller’s proﬁt Φ(m) declines. But we also allow for the possibility that Φ(m) is
monotonic: if b m = ∞, Φ(m) is monotonically increasing in m;i fb m =0 , Φ(m) is monotonically
decreasing in m.
Assumption 2 There exists a unique m∗ > 0 such that marginal seller’s proﬁti se q u a lt ot h e
development cost of his slot:
Φ(m∗) − c(m∗)=0 . (2)
For smaller platform sizes, m<m ∗, the proﬁt of the marginal seller exceeds the development
cost of the marginal slot, Φ(m) >c (m), while the opposite is true for larger platform sizes,
Φ(m) <c (m) if m>m ∗.







, which requires a minimum degree of convexity of the two aggregate cost
functions, assuming that a>0 and α>0. (See the appendix for details.) We will return to
three special/limiting cases:
7Figure 1: Weak and Strong Platform Eﬀects
Case I The cost functions f(·) and c(·) coincide, a = α and b = β. In this case, our assump-
tions hold if ρ> 1
β+2 = 1
b+2.
Case II Platform development costs are constant (and zero), α =0 . In this case, our assump-
tions are satisﬁed if ρ> 1
b+2.
Case III All sellers have the same ﬁxed cost (zero), a =0 . In this case, assumption 1 is always
satisﬁed since z(m)π(m) is a monotone function, while assumption 2 holds if ρ> 1
β+2.
A Taxonomy of Platform Eﬀects. The two numbers, m∗ and b m, allow us to provide a simple
but powerful taxonomy of the network or platform eﬀects at work. Intuitively, if the market
expansion eﬀect (indirect network eﬀect) is weak (relative to the competition eﬀect and the
rising ﬁxed cost f(·)), then the marginal seller’s proﬁt Φ(m) will be increasing only for small
m, or even be monotonically decreasing. In this case, b m<m ∗, and the platform eﬀects are
said to be weak. This case is illustrated in panel (a) of ﬁgure 1. If, on the other hand, the
market expansion eﬀect outweighs the competition eﬀect and rising ﬁxed cost for a large range
of platform sizes, then b m>m ∗,a n dt h ep l a t f o r me ﬀects are said to be strong. This case is
illustrated in panel (b) of ﬁgure 1.
Deﬁnition 1 Platform eﬀects are weak if b m<m ∗,a n ds o∂Φ(m∗)/∂m < 0.P l a t f o r me ﬀects
are strong if b m>m ∗,a n ds o∂Φ(m∗)/∂m > 0.
In the following remarks, we investigate under what conditions platform eﬀects are weak
versus strong.
Remark 1 The distinction between weak and strong platform eﬀe c t sc a nb el i n k e dt oa“ s t a n d -
alone utility” θ provided by the platform. Suppose buyers’ utility function takes the form
8weak strong












Table 1: Weak and Strong Platform Eﬀects in the CES-Example (with b = β)
u(m;θ)=v(m)+θ, and assume that v0(m) ≥ 0 for all m ≥ 0 and g00(z) ≥ 0 for all z ≥ 0.T h i s
implies that ∂z(m;θ)/∂θ > 0 and ∂2z(m;θ)/∂θ∂m ≤ 0.T h e n ,b m(θ) is weakly decreasing in θ
(and strictly decreasing if b m(θ) > 0), while m∗(θ) is strictly increasing in θ.H e n c e ,i f t h e r e
exists a b θ such that b m(b θ)=m∗(b θ), then the platform eﬀect is strong for θ<b θ and weak for
θ>b θ. That is, if the platform provides a high stand-alone utility (e.g., because of good services
that are provided independently of platform size), then the platform eﬀects purely generated
by buyer-seller interaction are weak, while the opposite is true if the platform provides a low
stand-alone utility.
Remark 2 The distinction between weak and strong platform eﬀects is closely linked to the
strength of indirect network eﬀects. This can be seen in a simple parametric example. To
focus on indirect network eﬀects, suppose that sellers oﬀer independent products so that π is
constant. Each buyer consumes one unit of each product and receives a constant utility per
product, i.e. u(m)=αm. Furthermore, suppose that g(ζ)=ζ.T h e n ,z(m)=αm.F i n a l l y ,l e t
c(m)=c0m3/2 and f(m)=f0m2/2.As e l l e r ’ sr e v e n u ei st h e nπz(m) and a buyer’s utility αm
so that the parameters π and α measure the strength of indirect network eﬀects. It turns out
that platform eﬀects are strong, b m>m ∗,i fa n do n l yi fαπ > f2
0/co. That is, platform eﬀects
are strong if and only if indirect network eﬀects are above a certain threshold, and platform
eﬀe c t sa r ew e a ko t h e r w i s e .
Example 3 (CES) In the CES-example, the distinction between weak and strong platform
eﬀects can be linked to the degree of product diﬀerentiation between sellers’ oﬀerings. As table
1 illustrates for the three special cases, platform eﬀects are weak if the products oﬀered by
sellers are suﬃciently good substitutes (ρ large), while they are strong if products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated (ρ small). Intuitively, the more diﬀerentiated are products, the faster increases
buyers’ utility with the number of products oﬀered on the platform (in the CES-example, this
is due to consumers’ love of variety), and so the stronger are the indirect network eﬀects.
3 Independently Owned Platforms
In this section, we derive the equilibrium under three ownership structures that are all vertically
disintegrated: open platform ownership (O), closed platform ownership (C), and monopoly
platform ownership (M).
• Open Platform Ownership (O). A population of ex ante identical (potential) intermedi-
aries sequentially enter the market for intermediation on the platform and decide which
9platform slots to develop. Each intermediary can develop at most one slot µp at cost
c(µp),a n do ﬀer it to one seller at the competitive rental price.
• Closed Platform Ownership (C). A population of ex ante identical (potential) inter-
mediaries sequentially enter the market for intermediation on the platform, and reserve
platform slots for development. However, early entrants (incumbent club members) can
deny access to the platform to later entrants (prospective members).12 After being ad-
mitted, each intermediary develops his reserved slot µp at cost c(µp),a n do ﬀers it to
house one seller at the market-clearing rental price.
• Monopoly Platform Ownership (M). All platform slots are owned by a monopoly inter-
mediary. The monopolist decides which platform slots to develop, and sets a uniform
rental price for all (developed) platform slots.13
Ownership is fragmented under open and closed platform ownerships and concentrated un-
der monopoly ownership. Under open platform ownership, incumbent intermediaries cannot
deny access to other intermediaries — in contrast to the cases of closed and monopoly platform
ownerships. As regards “clubs” or “closed platform ownership”, there are two polar cases to
consider. To the extent that frictionless Coasian bargaining between incumbent club members
and prospective members is feasible, the equilibrium outcome would replicate the one under
monopoly platform ownership (M). The other polar case is where side payments between
intermediaries are infeasible. This is the case we analyze under the label “closed platform
ownership” (C). One example relates to retailing with fragmented ownership. Here, the mod-
iﬁcations of zoning restrictions typically require the approval of the city council. A closed
platform then corresponds to the situation in which the city council acts according to the
interests of incumbent platform slot owners.
3.1 Positive Analysis
Open Platform Ownership. Under open platform ownership, free entry of rental-price taking
intermediaries implies that the cost of developing the marginal platform slot of type mp is equal
to the rental price r, i.e., r = c(mp).P r o ﬁt-maximizing participation decisions of sellers imply
that the marginal seller’s proﬁt net of the rental price is equal to zero, z(ms)π(ms)−f(ms)=r.
The competitive rental price r clears the rental market, mp = ms. The equilibrium platform
size mO is thus determined by
Φ(mO) ≡ z(mO)π(mO) − f(mO)=c(mO). (3)
(From assumption 2, it follows that mO is unique.) Comparing (2) and (3), we obtain the
following lemma.
12As we will later show, the interests of all of the admitted members are perfectly aligned. Hence, we can
remain agnostic about the club’s admission procedure (e.g., giving individual veto power to each club member
yields the same outcome as requiring unanimity).
13While it is easy to look at this possibility, we do not consider his potential ability to discriminate between
diﬀerent types of sellers.
10Lemma 1 Under open platform ownership, there is a unique equilibrium platform size given
by mO = m∗.
Graphically, equilibrium under open platform ownership is at the intersection of the Φ(·)
and c(·) curves in ﬁgure 1.
Closed Platform Ownership. Under closed platform ownership, incumbent intermediaries
can deny prospective intermediaries access to the platform. Since the most eﬃcient platform
slots will be reserved ﬁrst, the optimization problem for incumbent intermediaries consists in
maximizing each active intermediary’s proﬁt with respect to the number of active interme-
diaries, subject to: the participation constraint for sellers, the market clearing condition for
platform slots, and the condition that each intermediary makes nonnegative proﬁts. Formally,
maxmp r−c(µp) subject to z(ms)π(ms)−f(ms)=r, ms = mp,a n dr ≥ c(mp). Conditional on
being granted access to the platform, all intermediaries on the platform agree on the optimal
number of active intermediaries. Market clearing implies a platform size m = ms = mp.T h e
maximization problem can thus be rewritten as
max
m z(m)π(m) − f(m) (4)
s.t. z(m)π(m) − f(m) ≥ c(m).
The constraint reﬂects that prospective intermediaries cannot be forced to join the platform.
It follows trivially that the equilibrium platform size mC cannot be larger than under open
platform ownership: mC ≤ mO = m∗. Solving the maximization problem, we obtain the
following result.
Lemma 2 Under closed platform ownership, there is a unique equilibrium platform size given
by mC =m i n{b m,m∗}.
Proof. See appendix.
Graphically, the equilibrium under closed platform ownership is at the peak of the Φ(·)
curve when platform eﬀects are weak; see ﬁgure 1(a). When platform eﬀects are strong, the
equilibrium is at the intersection of the Φ(·) and c(·) curves in ﬁgure 1(b).
Monopoly Platform Ownership. Suppose now that all platform slots are owned by a mo-
nopolist. The monopolist’s problem consists in maximizing his proﬁt with respect to the total
number of platform slots mp, subject to the free-entry condition for sellers and the rental mar-
ket clearing condition. Formally, maxmp mpr−C(mp), subject to z(ms)π(ms)−f(ms)=r and
ms = mp. Market clearing implies a platform size m = ms = mp. The maximization problem
can thus be rewritten as maxm m[z(m)π(m) − f(m)]−C(m). Solving this problem, we obtain
the following result.
Lemma 3 Under monopoly platform ownership, the equilibrium platform size mM satisﬁes
mM ∈ (b m,m∗) if platform eﬀects are weak, and mM ∈ (m∗, b m) if platform eﬀects are strong.
Otherwise, if b m = m∗,w eh a v emM = b m = m∗.
Proof. See appendix.
11Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tp l a t f o r me ﬀects are weak, b m<m ∗. In this case, we have mM ∈ (b m,m∗).
Consider ﬁgure 1(a). To see that mM > b m, note that at any platform size m ≤ b m,am a r g i n a l
increase in platform size has a non-negative eﬀect on proﬁts for inframarginal platform slots
as Φ0(m) ≥ 0.F u r t h e r ,a ta n ym<m ∗, the marginal slot itself makes a positive contribution
to total proﬁts as Φ(m) >c (m). To see that mM <m ∗,n o t et h a ta ta n ym>b m,am a r g i n a l
increase in platform size reduces the proﬁts for inframarginal platform slots as Φ0(m) < 0.
Moreover, at any m ≥ m∗, the marginal slot makes a non-positive contribution to total proﬁts
as Φ(m) ≤ c(m).
Suppose second that platform eﬀects are strong, m∗ < b m.W et h e n h a v emM ∈ (m∗, b m).
Consider ﬁgure 1(b). To see that mM >m ∗,n o t et h a ta ta n yp l a t f o r ms i z em<b m,am a r g i n a l
increase in platform size increases the proﬁts for inframarginal platform slots as Φ0(m) > 0.
Further, at any m ≤ m∗, the marginal slot makes a non-negative contribution to total proﬁts
as Φ(m) ≥ c(m). To see that mM < b m,n o t et h a ta ta n yp l a t f o r ms i z em ≥ b m,am a r g i n a l
increase in platform size has a non-positive eﬀect on proﬁts for inframarginal platform slots as
Φ0(m) ≤ 0. Moreover, at any m>m ∗, the marginal slot makes a negative contribution to total
proﬁts as Φ(m) <c (m). Hence, when platform eﬀects are strong, the monopoly platform owner
optimally “subsidizes” the marginal seller by setting a rental price below marginal development
cost.14
A Comparison of Platform Sizes under the Three (Vertically Non-Integrated) Ownership
Structures. From our analysis, it is immediate to see that monopoly ownership unambiguously
leads to a larger platform size than closed platform ownership. Compared to the open platform,
the monopoly platform has a larger platform size if and only if platform eﬀects are strong. This
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium platform size under the three vertically non-integrated own-
ership structures can be ranked as follows. If platform eﬀects are weak, b m<m ∗,t h e n
mC <m M <m O.I fp l a t f o r me ﬀects are strong, m∗ < b m,t h e nmO = mC <m M.
Proof. This follows immediately from lemmas 1 to 3.
The corresponding rental charges satisfy rC >r M >r O if platform eﬀects are weak and
rO = rC <r M if platform eﬀects are strong. Hence, a monopoly platform owner always charges
a higher rental fee than an open platform — and yet platform size is larger under monopoly own-
ership when platform eﬀects are strong. To develop a better intuition for the result, interpret
platform size m as the “output” of the intermediaries, the “price” of which is the rental charge
r. The intermediaries as producers of platform slots face the industry production cost function
C(m). Under a fragmented ownership structure, each potential producer has a capacity of one
unit of output. The “inverse demand function” for platform slots is then given by the marginal
seller’s willingness to pay for a slot, Φ(m). By assumption 1, the inverse demand function is
single-peaked and obtains a unique maximum at b m ≥ 0. When comparing open and monopoly
platform ownerships, we are thus comparing a competitive market with a monopoly.
14Such cross-subsidization between platform slots on the same market side is distinct from the cross-
subsidization between market sides that has been analyzed in the two-sided markets literature (e.g., Rochet
and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006).
12Suppose ﬁrst that platform eﬀects are weak, b m<m ∗.I nt h es p e c i a lc a s eb m =0 , inverse
demand is monotonically downward-sloping. As is well known from intermediate microeco-
nomics, equilibrium output will then be lower under monopoly than in a competitive market,
since the monopolist has an incentive to restrict output so as to be able to charge a higher
price. Under closed platform ownership, members have an incentive to deny access as further
entry will reduce the price members can charge. Since each (atomless) member produces a
single unit of output (which is a slot of measure zero), closed platform ownership leads to a
measure zero of output. Equilibrium output is thus lower than under monopoly. With b m>0,
the comparison between the three ownership structures is similar to the case where b m =0 ,t h e
main diﬀerence being that the equilibrium platform size under closed platform ownership is of
positive measure. Note that if the marginal development cost function c(m) were constant (as
typically assumed in the literature on network eﬀects; see Economides, 1996), then platform
eﬀects would necessarily be weak.
Suppose now that platform eﬀects are strong, m∗ < b m. In this case, the industry’s marginal
(production) cost function c(m) intersects the inverse demand function in the latter’s increasing
part (compare ﬁgure 1b). Consequently, the equilibrium output levels of the open and closed
competitive markets coincide: under closed platform ownership, incumbent producers would
like to increase industry output above and beyond the level provided under open platform own-
ership, but cannot force production of additional producers at a price below cost. In contrast,
the monopolist can internalize network eﬀects (which cause the inverse demand function to be
locally upward-sloping) and subsidize production at the margin. Hence, the ranking of output
levels between competitive markets and monopoly is reversed if the relevant part of the inverse
demand function is upward-sloping.
3.2 Welfare Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the welfare properties of equilibria under the diﬀerent owner-
ship structures. Henceforth, we will assume that buyers’ utility is strictly increasing in platform
size m. As discussed in section 2, this can be for two reasons: consumers value variety, and
prices may decrease with the number of sellers.
Assumption 3 The utility function u(·) is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing.
An immediate implication of this assumption is that the mass z(m) of buyers visiting
the market place is strictly increasing in the mass m of sellers on the platform: z0(m)=
u0(m)/g0(z(m)) > 0.
Consumer Surplus Standard. In many countries, antitrust authorities seem to have adopted
a consumer (rather than a total) surplus standard. Since at given m, buyers enter until
g(z(m)) = u(m), the aggregate surplus of all buyers visiting a platform of size m is given
by S(m)=
R z(m)
0 [g(z(m)) − g(ξ)]dξ. Assumption 3 implies that one ownership structure in-
duces a larger buyer surplus than another if and only if it induces a larger platform size. As
the following result shows, the socially preferred ownership structure under the consumer sur-
plus standard is the open platform if platform eﬀects are weak, and the monopoly platform if
platform eﬀects are strong.
13Proposition 2 The ranking of ownership structures by consumer (buyer) surplus is:
S(mC) <S (mM) <S (mO) if platform eﬀects are weak;
S(mC)=S(mO) <S (mM) if platform eﬀects are strong.
Proof. This follows from proposition 1 and assumption 3.
The social ranking of ownership structures is less straightforward if total surplus is used as
the welfare criterion. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Total Surplus Standard. We now consider total surplus of buyers, sellers, and intermediaries




[g(z(m)) − g(ξ)]dξ +
Z m
0
[f(m) − f(µs)]dµs + {mΦ(m) − C(m)}, (5)
where the ﬁrst term is the aggregate surplus of buyers as before and the second term is the
aggregate surplus of sellers, while the last term in curly brackets is the aggregate surplus of
platform owners.
Let mW =a r gm a x m W(m) denote the platform size chosen by a benevolent social plan-






We now compare the platform sizes induced by the diﬀerent ownership structures with the
socially optimal platform size. First, we claim that the open platform is too small from a social
point of view, mO <m W,i fa n do n l yi f
z(mW)u0(mW)+mWf0(mW)+mWΦ0(mW) > 0. (7)
To see this, note that Φ(mW)−c(mW) < 0 if and only if (7) holds. The claim then follows from
Φ(mO)−c(mO)=0and assumption 2. Note that the l.h.s. of condition (7) represents the sum
of the externalities on active buyers, sellers, and intermediaries induced by a small increase
in platform size when m = mW:t h e ﬁrst term is the increase in aggregate buyer surplus,
the second term the increase in aggregate seller surplus, while the third term represents the
aggregate change in rental payments received by the existing mW platform owners. Since
u0(m) > 0 and f0(m) > 0 for all m, condition (7) can be violated only if Φ0(mW) < 0.T h e
single-peakedness of Φ(·) (assumption 1) then implies that Φ0(mO) < 0 is a necessary condition
for mO >m W. That is, the open platform induces a socially excessive platform size only if
platform eﬀects are weak.
15We follow the I.O. literature on socially optimal entry (e.g., Spence, 1976; von Weizsäcker, 1980; Mankiw
and Whinston, 1986) in assuming that the planner chooses the mass of entering sellers (and thus the mass of
developed slots), taking consumer behavior and sellers’ pricing as given. This has been called the “structural
second-best” as it corresponds to structural regulation (Vives, 1999).
16In the context of our retailing example, the social planner may be a total surplus maximizing city council that
designs zoning laws and provides subsidies to developers of retail space, thereby in eﬀect determining platform
size m.
14Example 4 (CES) Consider the CES-example and assume that there is no heterogeneity on
the seller side, a =0(case III). Holding ﬁxed all other parameters, there exists a critical value
b ρ such that product diversity oﬀered by an open platform is excessively large, mO >m W,i fa n d
only if the products oﬀered are suﬃciently good substitutes, ρ>b ρ.
Second, we claim that monopoly ownership always induces a platform that is too small from
a social point of view, mM <m W. To see this, note that mM maximizes the joint proﬁts of
intermediaries, the third term in equation (5). The claim then follows from the observation that
the ﬁrst two terms (the aggregate surplus of buyers and sellers) are monotonically increasing
in platform size m. In conjunction with proposition 1, we thus obtain that mC <m M <m W
if platform eﬀects are weak, while mC = mO <m M <m W if platform eﬀects are strong.
We do not assume that total surplus W(m) is single-peaked in m. Nevertheless, we obtain
the following result on welfare.
Proposition 3 The ranking of ownership structures by total surplus is:
W(mC) <W (mM) <W(mW) if platform eﬀects are weak;
W(mC)=W(mO) <W(mM) <W(mW) if platform eﬀects are strong.
Proof. To see that W(mC) <W (mM), independently of whether platform eﬀects are weak
or strong, note ﬁrst that mM maximizes the third term in equation (5), while mC does not.
Furthermore, the ﬁrst two terms in (5) are strictly larger when evaluated at mM rather than
mC <m M as both terms are monotonically increasing in m.T os e et h a tW(mM) <W(mW),
recall that mW =a r g m a x m W(m),w h i l emM maximizes the third term in (5), but not the
ﬁrst two terms. Finally, if platform eﬀects are strong, mC = mO,a n ds oW(mC)=W(mO).
Implications for Competition Policy. For competition policy, two important sets of ques-
tions arise. First, given that the platform is owned by independent intermediaries, should the
incumbent owners be allowed to exclude potential entrants? As we have shown, exclusion of
potential entrants has welfare eﬀects only if platform eﬀects are weak, and these welfare eﬀects
are ambiguous since an open platform may lead to a socially excessive or insuﬃcient platform
size. Note that if the antitrust authority were to use consumer surplus as its welfare criterion,
then exclusion is never socially beneﬁcial as it always weakly reduces platform size.
Second, given that the seller side is fragmented, is horizontal integration (monopolization)
necessarily harmful from a social point of view? As proposition 3 indicates, the answer is “no”:
horizontal integration is beneﬁcial to welfare if platform eﬀects are strong. Even if platform
eﬀects are weak, monopolization may increase total surplus (and necessarily does so in the case
of monopolization of a closed platform).17 Importantly, this eﬃciency defense for monopoly
intermediation is not based on cost eﬃciency but on the internalization of externalities.
More speciﬁcally (and related to the literature on optimal product variety), with respect to
the degree of product diﬀerentiation, our analysis suggests that in markets in which products
are close substitutes, the open platform may lead to socially excessive product variety due to the
17In the CES-example, there exist parameters such that W(m
O) <W (m
M) even when platform eﬀects are
weak.
15competition (or “business-stealing”) eﬀect among sellers.18 A monopoly owner of a platform
takes this competition eﬀect into account. However, due to its market power, it sets high rental
charges which leads to a socially insuﬃcient number of sellers and too little product variety.
Here, an open platform leads to more product variety than a monopoly platform. In markets
in which products are bad substitutes (we may think of market segments for luxury goods) the
competition eﬀect is less pronounced. Here, the monopoly platform provides actually more (but
socially insuﬃcient) variety than an open platform because it takes into account that it may
achieve inframarginal gains by subsidizing platform slots at the margin. Such a subsidization
at the margin is not possible on the open platform.
4 Vertically Integrated Platforms
In this section, we turn to the analysis of vertically integrated platforms, where each active
seller owns her own platform slot, and so trade can be thought of as being non-intermediated.
We consider two vertically integrated platform ownership structures: an open integrated (OI)
and a closed integrated (CI) ownership structure. Since in our reduced-form approach we
do not explicitly consider sellers’ pricing decisions, we do not analyze the case of a vertically
integrated monopoly supplier-intermediary.
• Open Integrated Platform Ownership (OI). A population of (potential) sellers sequen-
tially decide whether and which platform slots to develop. Each seller can develop at
most one slot µp at cost c(µp) to sell her own good.
• Closed Integrated Platform Ownership (CI). A population of (potential) sellers sequen-
tially decide whether and which platform slots to reserve for development. However,
early entrants (incumbent club members) can deny access to the platform to later en-
trants (prospective members).19 After being admitted, each seller develops her reserved
slot µp at cost c(µp) to sell her own good.
Since sellers and platform slots are heterogeneous, equilibrium under both ownership struc-
tures depends on the sequence in which sellers decide whether and which platform slots to
develop. We assume that sellers’ participation decisions are taken in increasing order of ﬁxed
costs: more eﬃcient sellers move before less eﬃcient sellers.20 Since each entrant will want to
develop the best available platform slot, this sequencing results in a perfectly positive correla-
tion between seller type and slot type across seller-slot pairs.
Open Integrated Platform Ownership. Consider ﬁrst the case of an open integrated platform.
Since seller and slot types will be perfectly correlated across active seller-slot pairs, the marginal
18While this result on excessive product diversity appears familiar from the existing literature, it is derived in
a more general framework that encompasses network externalities.
19As in the case of the (non-integrated) closed ownership structure, the interests of all of the admitted members
are perfectly aligned.
20This assumption may be justiﬁed as follows. In a natural dynamic extension of our model, suppose that the
sequential entry of sellers onto the platform takes time and sellers discount proﬁts. In this case, more eﬃcient
sellers have a higher willingness-to-pay for early (rather than late) entry than less eﬃcient sellers.
16seller m with ﬁxed cost f(m) faces development cost c(m). The equilibrium platform size mOI
is thus determined by the free-entry condition
Φ(mOI) ≡ z(mOI)π(mOI) − f(mOI)=c(mOI). (8)
Hence, the outcome is identical to that of an open non-integrated platform, mO = mOI = m∗,
as summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Under open integrated platform ownership, the unique equilibrium platform size
mOI is given by mOI = m∗.
Closed Integrated Platform Ownership. Consider now the case of a closed integrated plat-
form. Each incumbent seller-intermediary of type µs = µp = µ wants to choose platform size
m so as to maximize its net proﬁt z(m)π(m)−f(µ)−c(µ) subject to the constraint that each
active seller-intermediary obtains a non-negative net proﬁt, z(m)π(m)−f(m)−c(m) ≥ 0.T h e
solution to this problem, mCI,e i t h e rs a t i s ﬁes the constraint with equality, and so mCI = m∗,
or else z0(mCI)π(mCI)+z(mCI)π0(mCI)=0 . We therefore obtain the following result.
Lemma 5 Under closed integrated platform ownership, the equilibrium platform size mCI sat-
isﬁes b m ≤ mCI ≤ m∗ if platform eﬀe c t sa r ew e a k( w i t ht h eﬁrst inequality being strict if, in
addition, b m>0), and mCI = m∗ if platform eﬀects are strong.
Proof. See appendix.
Vertical Integration and Platform Size. The eﬀects of vertical integration on equilibrium
platform sizes are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under an open ownership structure, vertical integration has no eﬀect on equi-
l i b r i u mp l a t f o r ms i z e :mOI = mO. Under a closed ownership structure, vertical integration
weakly increases the equilibrium platform size: mCI ≥ mC, where the inequality is strict if
platform eﬀects are weak and b m>0.
To see why mCI ≥ mC, note that, under a closed non-integrated ownership structure,
the intermediaries do not capture all of the inframarginal rents of sellers (due to the uniform
rental charge). The incumbent intermediaries thus have a smaller incentive to admit additional
members than under vertical integration, where they capture all of the inframarginal rents of
sellers. Observe that if all sellers were homogeneous (i.e., if f were constant), all intermediaries
would make zero proﬁt in equilibrium under vertical separation. In this case, vertical integration
would not aﬀect the allocation under closed ownership.
Example 5 (CES) Consider the CES-example, and suppose that a = α and b = β (case I).
Then vertical integration of a closed platform leads to an increase in platform size from b m to
m∗ if platform eﬀects are weak and b m>0, which holds for ρ ∈ (2/(4 + β),1/2).
Welfare Eﬀects of Vertical Integration. What are the welfare eﬀects of vertical integration?
Proposition 4 says that vertical integration of an open platform has no eﬀects, while vertical
integration of a closed platform weakly increases platform size. As the following proposition
shows, vertical integration of a closed platform is weakly welfare increasing. This is due to the
internalization of vertical externalities.
17Proposition 5 Vertical integration of an open platform has no welfare eﬀects: S(mOI)=
S(mO) and W(mOI)=W(mO). Vertical integration of a closed platform weakly increases
buyer surplus, S(mCI) ≥ S(mC) and (assuming that a seller’s gross proﬁt z(m)π(m) is single-
peaked in platform size m) total surplus, W(mCI) ≥ W(mC), where the inequalities are strict
if platform eﬀe c t sa r ew e a ka n db m>0.21
Proof. As regards vertical integration of an open platform, the assertion follows immediately
from proposition 4. As regards vertical integration of a closed platform, the result on consumer
surplus follows from proposition 4 and assumption 3. To see the result on total surplus, note
that





By assumption 3, the ﬁrst term is strictly positive for all m. By assumption 2, the second
term is strictly positive for all m<m ∗. The single-peakedness of z(m)π(m) implies that
z0(mCI)π(mCI)+z(mCI)π0(mCI)=0if z0(m∗)π(m∗)+z(m∗)π0(m∗) ≤ 0,a n dz0(mCI)π(mCI)+
z(mCI)π0(mCI) > 0 otherwise. It follows that the third term is weakly positive for all m ≤ mCI.
Hence, W0(m) > 0 for all m ≤ mCI,a n ds oW(mCI) ≥ W(mC), where the inequality is strict
if mCI >m C. The result then follows by applying proposition 4.
5 Two-Sided Pricing
In the preceding analysis, buyers had free access to the platform. Indeed, it is often imprac-
ticable to charge consumers, especially in brick-and-mortar retail markets. In this section, we
consider two-sided pricing: as before, each seller needs to pay r to rent a platform slot, but now
each buyer has to pay a “subscription fee” s (which can be positive or negative) to participate
on the platform. We conﬁne attention to the three basic ownership structures, O, C,a n dM.
As we will show, the notions of weak and strong platform eﬀects can be extended to the case of
two-sided pricing. Most importantly, the ranking of ownership structures by induced platform
size (proposition 1) carries over to this setting.
Since each buyer has to pay the subscription fee s to visit the platform, the mass of ac-
tive buyers is now given by z(m,s) ≡ g−1(u(m) − s). Denote the sum of the proﬁto ft h e
marginal seller (gross of the rental price r) and the subscription revenue (from buyers) per
seller/developer by
Ψ(m,s) ≡ z(m,s)π(m) − f(m)+sz(m,s)/m.
In analogy to our assumption on Φ, we assume now that Ψ is single-peaked in m, holding s
ﬁxed. In addition, Ψ is assumed to have a unique interior maximizer with respect to s for any
given m.22 For any given m, b s(m) denotes the unique solution to Ψs(m,s)=0 .
21In the CES-example, the single-peakedness of z(m)π(m) holds for all ρ. The result also holds if, instead, we
assume that the aggregate proﬁt of sellers and intermediaries,
U m
0 [z(m)π(m) − f(µ) − c(µ)]dµ,i ss i n g l e - p e a k e d
in m.
In the CES-example, we can provide conditions on parameters such that vertical integration strictly increases
total surplus. A particular case is the speciﬁcation from above (a = α, b = β,a n dρ ∈ (2/(4 + β),1/2)).
22We have veriﬁed that, for some parameter constellations, all assumptions made in this section are satisﬁed
in our CES-example.
18Remark 3 Assume g00(z) ≥ 0. Then, for each m, Ψ(m,s) is concave in s and has an interior
maximizer. (This is shown in the appendix).
Correspondingly, let for any given s,
b m(s) = argmax
m≥0
Ψ(m,s).
If Ψ(m,s) is strictly increasing for all m ≥ 0,t h e nb m(s)=∞. Otherwise, b m(s) is implicitly
deﬁned by Ψm(b m(s),s)=0 . Suppose that Ψ(m,s) <c (m) for m suﬃciently large, holding s
ﬁxed, and deﬁne m∗(s) as the largest solution to Ψ(m∗(s),s) − c(m∗(s)) = 0. Hence, (gener-
ically) ∂
∂m {Ψ(m∗(s),s) − c(m∗(s))} < 0. We now extend our previous deﬁnition of weak and
strong platform eﬀects.
Deﬁnition 2 Platform eﬀects are weak at s if b m(s) <m ∗(s),a n ds o∂Ψ(m∗(s),s)/∂m < 0.
Platform eﬀects are strong at s if b m(s) >m ∗(s),a n ds o∂Ψ(m∗(s),s)/∂m > 0.
In line with standard results from oligopoly theory (e.g., Vives, 1999), we further assume
that sellers’ aggregate gross proﬁts (per unit mass of buyers) are weakly decreasing in m, i.e.,
d[mπ(m)]/dm ≤ 0. Together with g00(z) ≥ 0, this implies the following result.
Lemma 6 Suppose d[mπ(m)]/dm ≤ 0 and g00(z) ≥ 0.T h e n , Ψms(m,b s(m)) > 0,a n ds o
b s0(m) > 0.
We are now equipped to discuss equilibrium allocations under open, closed, and monopoly
platform ownership.
Open Platform Ownership. Suppose that if a subscription fee is charged to buyers, each
active platform owner (intermediary) receives its fair share of the proceeds: sz(m,s)/m.I n
this case, any equilibrium is characterized by (i) free entry of platform developers, i.e., r +
sz(m,s)/m = c(m), and (ii) free entry of sellers, i.e, r = z(m,s)π(m) − f(m).( F r e ee n t r yo f
buyers is implicit in the deﬁnition of z(m,s)=g−1(u(m) − s).) In equilibrium, m and s must
satisfy
m[z(m,s)π(m) − f(m) − c(m)] + sz(m,s)=0 ,
or Ψ(m,s)=c(m). Note that any tuple (m,s) satisfying this equation can be sustained as a
competitive equilibrium: indeed, there is a continuum of equilibria in which all developed slots
are rented out, µp = µs = m. Since there is free entry of platform developers, any equilibrium
(m,s) on the open platform satisﬁes m = m∗(s).
One natural equilibrium arises when platform developers charge a price equal to marginal
cost on each side of the market, and so s =0 ,a n dm = mO = m∗(0). This is the equilibrium
that we analyzed before under one-sided pricing. Henceforth, we will focus on another natural
equilibrium, namely the one that maximizes developers’ joint proﬁts mr + sz − C(m),o r
mΨ(m,s) − C(m), subject to the constraint that each developer covers his cost. Hence, we
can write the program as maxm,s mΨ(m,s)−C(m),s u b j e c tt oΨ(m,s)=c(m). This program
can be rewritten as maxm,s mc(m) − C(m) subject to Ψ(m,s)=c(m).S i n c e d{mc(m) −
C(m)}/dm = mc0(m) ≥ 0, the program is equivalent to maximizing platform size m subject
19to the free entry condition for developers, Ψ(m,s)=c(m). The associated Lagrangian is given
by L = m + λ{Ψ(m,s) − c(m)}.T h eﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂L
∂m
=1 + λ{Ψm(m,s) − c0(m)} =0 , (9)
∂L
∂s
= λΨs(m,s)=0 , (10)
∂L
∂λ
= Ψ(m,s) − c(m)=0 . (11)
Let sO2 and mO2 denote the equilibrium subscription fee and platform size, respectively. From
(10) and (11), it follows that, sO2 = b s(mO2) and mO2 = m∗(sO2), which we assumed to be
unique. The intersection of these functions is necessarily stable since
m∗0(sO2)=−
Ψs(mO2,s O2)
Ψm(mO2,s O2) − c0(mM2)
=0 ,
where the second equality obtains since Ψs(mO2,s O2)=0and Ψm(mO2,s O2) <c 0(mM2).N o t e






where εz,s(m,s) ≡ zs(m,s)s/z(m,s) is the elasticity of the number of active buyers with respect
to the subscription fee s.
Closed Platform Ownership. Under closed ownership structure, r and s are chosen so as
to maximize the proﬁt of each active developer, r + sz/m. The program is thus given by
maxm,s Ψ(m,s) subject to Ψ(m,s) ≥ c(m). If the constraint is non-binding, the ﬁrst-order
conditions are given by Ψs(m,s)=0and Ψm(m,s)=0 . Their solution is assumed to be
unique, and it is given by sC2 = b s(mC2) and mC2 = b m(sC2). We assume that the intersection





Even if the constraint Ψ(m,s) ≥ c(m) is binding, it is optimal for platform owners to set s
so as to maximize Ψ(m,s) for any given m,a n ds osC2 = b s(mC2). However, in this case, the
program becomes the same as that of the open platform, and so mC2 = mO2 and sC2 = sO2.
Independently of whether or not the constraint is binding, the equilibrium subscription fee is






Monopoly Platform Ownership. The problem for a monopoly platform owner is to maximize
mΨ(m,s)−C(m) with respect to m and s.F o ra n yg i v e nm, the proﬁt-maximizing subscription
20fee b s(m) satisﬁes Ψs(m,b s(m)) = 0.F o ra n yg i v e ns, the proﬁt-maximizing platform size e m(s)
satisﬁes e m(s)Ψm(e m(s),s)+Ψ(e m(s),s) − c(e m(s)) = 0.
We assume that in (m,s)-space, the curves e m(s) and b s(m) have a unique intersection at
(mM2,s M2) with mM2 = e m(sM2) and sM2 = b s(mM2). Again, the intersection of these curves





From the ﬁrst-order condition, the proﬁt-maximizing subscription fee is given by the same






Comparison of Ownership Structures. As in section 3, we compare the equilibrium outcomes
under the diﬀerent ownership structures. In the remainder, we assume that sellers’ aggregate
gross proﬁts (per unit mass of buyers) are weakly decreasing in platform size, whereas total
gross surplus of buyers and sellers per unit mass of buyers are increasing in platform size, i.e.,
d[mπ(m)]/dm ≤ 0 <d [mπ(m)+u(m)]/dm. In addition, we assume g00(z) ≥ 0. We then obtain
the following ranking of allocations with respect to ownership structures.
Proposition 6 If platform eﬀects are weak at sO2,t h e nmC2 <m M2 <m O2, zC2 <z M2 <
zO2,a n dsC2 <s M2 <s O2.I fp l a t f o r me ﬀects are strong at sO2,t h e nmC2 = mO2 <m M2,
zC2 = zO2 <z M2,a n dsC2 = sO2 <s M2.
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition shows that the ordering of ownership structures by induced platform size
carries over to our setting with two-sided pricing. In spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, the
subscription fee is larger for an ownership structure with a larger platform size, it continues to
hold that an ownership structure that leads to a larger platform size also attracts more buyers.
With respect to the prevalence of weak versus strong platform eﬀects, there is an important
diﬀerence compared to our previous analysis. Here, ∂Ψ(m∗(s),s)/∂m is evaluated at s = sO2,
whereas under one-sided pricing it is evaluated at s =0 . The case of weak platform eﬀects is
illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
Welfare Properties. As regards buyer surplus, an ownership structure that attracts more
consumers than another generates a larger buyer surplus. Since there is a positive monotone
relationship between m and z across ownership structures (see proposition 6), buyer surplus
is higher under one ownership structure than under another if and only if its induced size is
larger. The ranking of ownership structures by consumer surplus then follows immediately
from proposition 6.
Total surplus under two-sided pricing is given by
W(m,s) ≡ z(m,s)u(m) −
Z z(m,s)
0




Let mW2 denote the welfare-maximizing platform size under two-sided pricing. In analogy to











Figure 2: Weak Platform Eﬀects at sO2.
Proposition 7 The ranking of ownership structures by total surplus is:
W(mC2) <W(mM2) <W(mW2) if platform eﬀe c t sa r ew e a ka tsO2;
W(mC2)=W(mO2) <W(mM2) <W(mW2) if platform eﬀects are strong at sO2.
As under one-sided pricing, a monopoly platform ownership may generate a larger total
surplus than an open ownership structure, and necessarily does so if platform eﬀects are strong
at sO2.23
6 Discussion
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss possible re-interpretations and extensions of our model.
Economics of Zoning Laws. Our analysis can be used to study the implications of diﬀerent
zoning restrictions on the number of slots developed for retailing. It suggests that if products
are good substitutes (so that the competition eﬀect is suﬃciently strong), an unregulated
market for retailing may lead to a socially excessive number of shops. This provides a rationale
for zoning laws.24 However, if zoning laws are made on behalf of existing property owners




24Similarly, the government may become a regulator by issuing licenses for certain types of business, where
the allocation mechanism must be chosen such that the most eﬃcient ﬁrms enter.
22(who restrict the number of slots) there is always social underprovision of shops. This means
that a laissez-faire policy is often performing better than a policy in which the legislator is
captured by the interests of existing property owners. However, the latter allocation can also
be improved by horizontal or vertical integration. In particular, if the legislator is captured by
the interests of established owners, horizontal integration is necessarily welfare improving. For
the case in point this implies that (national) antitrust policy optimally depends on whether
the (local) legislator is captured by a particular interest group.
Brick-and-Mortar Retailing Reconsidered. In brick-and-mortar retailing, diﬀerent owner-
ship structures coexist. On the one hand, many cities’ downtown retailing districts are char-
acterized by open and dispersed ownership. In a great number of instances, landlords occupy
single lots and oﬀer space to one retailer. This corresponds to open platform ownership. In
some instances, the sellers are also the owners of their retail space, which corresponds to an
open integrated platform.25 On the other hand, most suburban shopping malls are operated
by a shopping center developer, and are thus characterized by monopoly platform ownership.
Does this suggest that one of these ownership structures is socially inferior? The answer
is, “no, not necessarily,” as we will argue now. The crucial diﬀerence between a downtown
retailing district and a suburban shopping mall is that many consumers work (and sometimes
live) downtown, while suburban shopping malls are located in areas with a relatively low
population density, and so consumers travel to them only for shopping.
This may be formalized by reconsidering the parameter θ i nt h em a r k e ts i z ef u n c t i o nz to
capture location-speciﬁc demand. As in remark 1, let z(m;θ) denote the number of consumers
visiting a market place of size m and location characteristic θ.Ah i g h e rv a l u eo fθ will be asso-
ciated with a larger location-speciﬁc “stand-alone” demand and, therefore, less responsiveness
of demand to the number of sellers: z(m;θ) is increasing in θ,w h i l e∂z(m;η)/∂m is decreasing
in θ. Since a downtown location (d) has arguably a larger stand-alone demand than a suburban
location (s), θd >θ s.
A sd i s c u s s e di nr e m a r k1 ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tb m(θd) ≤ b m(θs), where the inequality is strict
if b ms > 0,a n dm∗(θd) >m ∗(θs). Hence, everything else equal, platform eﬀects are “more
likely” to be strong in a suburban location than in a downtown location. Since monopoly
ownership is the welfare-maximizing ownership structure under strong platform eﬀects while
open ownership can be welfare-maximizing under weak platform eﬀects, a shopping mall may
be the socially optimal ownership structure in a suburban location, while open ownership may
be socially optimal in a downtown location. (Note that this does not imply that product
diversity is larger in a suburban shopping mall than in a downtown retailing district.)
To the extent that a shopping center developer actively selects retailers and adjusts rental
contracts to internalize externalities, there is an additional reason for the platform eﬀect to be
strong in a shopping mall.26
25In both cases, the assumption that the costs of providing such space are non-decreasing in the number of
slots can be justiﬁed by invoking a constant quality standard of slot provision: the worse the location of a retail
slot, the larger the costs that have to be incurred to make the slot as attractive to consumers as a better located
slot. If the cost is incurred by the seller, the rental price paid to the landlord has to be adjusted accordingly.
In some other instances, the downtown retailing district is constrained by zoning restrictions. If these restric-
tions coincide with those preferred by incumbent owners, this corresponds to a closed platform.
26In our framework, consumers care only about the number of sellers on the platform, and all sellers impose
the same externality on all other sellers. In the real world, however, some sellers may impose greater (positive)
23Cost Sharing of Development Costs and Congestion Externalities. In our model, we have
assumed that each intermediary bears the development costs of his slot. However, if platform
owners form a cooperative, development costs may be shared among them. In the case of equal
cost sharing, if incumbent owners have the right to exclude potential entrants, incumbent own-
ers are more restrictive in admitting additional intermediaries than without cost redistribution
because joining owners inﬂict a negative externality on incumbent owners by increasing the
average ﬁxed cost born by the typical incumbent. If exclusion is not possible but equal cost
sharing is maintained, more intermediaries enter the platform than in the absence of equal
cost sharing, and independent intermediaries make zero proﬁt in equilibrium since cost sharing
makes them homogeneous ex post. Hence, any overprovision of product diversity under open
platform ownership becomes more pronounced when development costs are shared equally.
Alternatively, the positive indirect network eﬀect present in our model could be counteracted
by negative congestion externalities arising from too many buyers on the platform. Such
externalities often arise in physical markets. But they also come about in virtual markets
whenever there are capacity constraints. These externalities can easily be incorporated into
our model. Suppose, in particular, that a platform slot is developed at zero cost but that there
exists a congestion cost K(m) so that the congestion cost per intermediary is K(m)/m.T h i s
interpretation is then formally equivalent to the model with cost redistribution.
Platforms without Slot Structure. Software platforms do not have a slot structure, as as-
sumed in our paper. Nevertheless, our analysis still applies to integrated and monopoly own-
ership structures. Even in the absence of a slot structure, platform size can be interpreted as
the number of applications that can be run on a platform as long as platform development
costs are weakly increasing and weakly convex in the number of potential applications. This
includes zero marginal costs as a special case.
Consider, for instance, software platforms for mobile phones. There, an example of monopoly
ownership is the platform oﬀered by Microsoft, while an example of vertically integrated own-
ership is Symbian, a platform jointly developed by several handset makers (for details, see
Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee, 2006).
Transaction Fees. In a number of markets, intermediaries do not charge a ﬁxed access fee or
rental price but a price which depends on transaction volume. Examples include internet travel
agents (e.g., Expedia, Opodo) and card payment systems (e.g., Visa, Mastercard, American
Express).27 Is it possible to extend our model to allow for a fee per transaction (rather than a
externalities on rival sellers than some other sellers (e.g., by oﬀering complementary rather than substitute
products). A monopoly platform owner is then in a bett e rp o s i t i o nt h a nf r a g m e n t e do w n e r sa r et os e l e c t
the sellers that impose the greatest externalities on the other sellers. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that
shopping mall developers use the rental pricing scheme to internalize some of these externalities. See, for example,
Pashigian and Gould (1998), and Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast (2002). It is in principle possible to extend
our framework to accommodate such diﬀerences between ownership structures, namely by parameterizing the
variable proﬁt function by the ownership structure’s ability to internalize externalities between sellers. However,
we feel that such an extension would be more fruitful in the context of a particular example that imposes
additional structure on the problem.
27Expedia and American Express correspond to monopoly ownership in the sense that control rights are
concentrated in the publicly traded ﬁrm’s board. Opodo, an internet travel agency owned and operated by
nine leading European airlines (and a travel industry technology provider) corresponds to a vertically integrated
ownership structure. Visa and Mastercard correspond to open platform ownership: the banks which own Visa
and Mastercard act as ﬁnancial intermediaries between buyers and sellers.
24ﬁxed access charge)? If we introduce a transaction fee in our CES example, a seller’s proﬁti s
of the form h(y)z(m)π(m) − f(µs),w h e r eh is a decreasing function of the transaction fee (in
percent of revenues) y. The impact of diﬀerent ownership structures on platform size can also
be analyzed in this case. In the presence of a transaction charge, we would expect that platform
size under open ownership depends on whether or not ownership is vertically integrated. We
believe this to be an interesting avenue for further research. However, since competition in the
product market is directly aﬀected by the level of the transaction fee, a reduced-form approach
seems less useful and we expect results to be less general.
Stability of Ownership Structures. In our analysis, the ownership structure was taken as
given. But which ownership structure is likely to emerge? To address this question, we provide a
“stability analysis” in an earlier version of this paper, Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl (2004). There, we
call an ownership structure “stable” (with respect to horizontal integration) if no outside player
can make a positive proﬁt by acquiring all property rights on the platform in an appropriately-
deﬁned acquisition game. We show that monopoly is the only stable ownership structure when
platform eﬀects are strong, while the vertically-integrated ownership structures OI and CI can
be stable when platform eﬀects are weak; see Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl (2004) for details.
Competition between Market Places. An important extension of our framework is to consider
competition not only within, but also between platforms. We will analyze this issue in a separate
paper (Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl, 2006; see also Smith and Hay, 2005).
7C o n c l u s i o n
Intermediaries ﬁgure very importantly in the formation of two-sided markets. In this paper, we
have developed a general theoretical framework of a trading platform with two-sided network
eﬀects, which allows for intermediated and non-intermediated trade. We have provided a useful
binary index of the strength of the platform eﬀects involved (“weak” versus “strong”). Indeed,
as we have shown, the ranking of ownership structures by induced platform size (or product
diversity) and welfare crucially depends on this index of platform eﬀects. If platform eﬀects
are strong, equilibrium platform size under monopoly ownership is larger than under dispersed
ownership. In this case, all ownership structures induce a socially insuﬃc i e n tp r o d u c td i v e r s i t y ,
and monopoly is the socially preferred ownership structure. In contrast, if platform eﬀects are
weak, monopoly ownership induces a smaller platform than an open ownership structure. In
this case, only an open ownership structure may induce a socially excessive product variety. As
we have shown, these insights do not depend upon whether platform owners can charge only
sellers for platform access, or both sellers and buyers.
As discussed in the introduction, antitrust authorities in the U.S. and Europe have recently
been concerned about anticompetitive practices in markets where buyers and sellers need access
to a trading platform (e.g., airports, ports, and B2B platforms). Our theoretical framework
allows us to address three important policy issues: (1) monopolization, (2) vertical integration,
and (3) exclusion.
(1) Assuming the seller side is fragmented, monopolization of the platform is welfare-
enhancing if platform eﬀects are strong. If platform eﬀects are weak, the welfare eﬀect of
monopolization of an open platform is ambiguous. However, the monopolization of a closed
ownership platform is always socially beneﬁcial.
25(2) Assuming that ownership of the platform is dispersed, vertical integration weakly in-
creases welfare if platform eﬀects are weak, and has no welfare eﬀects otherwise.
(3) The eﬀects on total surplus of allowing incumbent platform owners to exclude new
entrants are ambiguous. Exclusion may actually increase total surplus if platform eﬀects are
weak. However, if consumer surplus is used as a welfare criterion, exclusion is always socially
h a r m f u li fe x e r c i s e d .
Interestingly, a report by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission staﬀ on B2B electronic plat-
forms28 does not express concerns about vertical integration per se but only about potential
exclusion of competitors on the vertically integrated side of the market. This is in line with
our welfare results.
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Appendix: Proofs
The CES-example. Here, we discuss assumptions 1 and 2 in the context of our CES-example.
Assumption 1 concerns the marginal seller’s proﬁt. If ρ>1/2,t h e ne a c hs e l l e r ’ sg r o s sp r o ﬁt
z(m)π(m) is monotonically decreasing in m. Since the marginal seller’s ﬁxed cost f(m) is
increasing in m, the marginal seller’s proﬁt Φ(m) must be decreasing in m, and so b m =0 ,a n d
the assumption is satisﬁed. If ρ<1/2,t h e ne a c hs e l l e r ’ sg r o s sp r o ﬁt z(m)π(m) is monotonically
increasing in m while the marginal seller’s ﬁxed cost is still weakly increasing in m. Then, an
interior solution for b m may exist. However, if Φ0(m) > 0 for m suﬃciently large then b m = ∞.
This condition is equivalent to ρ< 1
b+2. Hence, there exists a unique interior maximum b m only
if 1
b+2 <ρ<1/2.29
Assumption 2 says that Φ(m) − c(m) is strictly positive for m<m ∗, and strictly negative
for m>m ∗. the sum of marginal net proﬁts of sellers and platform owners. If ρ>1/2, Φ(m) is
monotonically decreasing, while c(m) is increasing in m, and so the assumption holds trivially.








P r o o fo fl e m m a2 . Suppose platform eﬀects are weak, m∗ > b m. Then, the marginal
development cost function c(m) intersects the marginal seller’s proﬁt function to the right
of the latter’s peak; see ﬁgure 1. Since incumbent club members’ interests with respect to
platform size are perfectly aligned (provided each member makes nonnegative proﬁts), each
club member’s proﬁt is maximized at the platform size mC = b m, where the marginal seller’s
proﬁt Φ(m) is maximized. The marginal club member at platform size b m obtains a strictly
positive proﬁt, r − c(b m) > 0,w h e r er = Φ(b m). In the special case b m =0 , the equilibrium
platform size is of measure zero since, in this case, an incumbent club member’s proﬁti s
decreasing in the number of club members.
Suppose now that platform eﬀects are strong, m∗ < b m. Then, the marginal club member
would make a loss at platform size b m. In this case, incumbent club members would like to
admit more members than the number of entering intermediaries under free entry, and so the
equilibrium platform size is equal to that under open platform membership, mC = mO = m∗.
Finally, note that it follows from assumptions 1 and 2 that mC is unique.
29As u ﬃcient condition for the marginal seller’s proﬁt to be single-peaked is the logconcavity of this function.
Logconcavity is implied by ρ ≥
1





y−x).T h i se x p r e s s i o ni sl o g c o n c a v ei nm if m
y−x is convex in m, i.e., y−x ≥ 1. Using the parameters
of our model, this inequality becomes b −
1−2ρ
ρ ≥ 1, which is equivalent to ρ ≥
1
b+1.
28P r o o fo fl e m m a3 . The equilibrium platform size under monopoly ownership, mM,m u s t
satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition
Φ(mM)+mMΦ0(mM)=c(mM) (14)
Note that there may be more than one platform size which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order and second-
order conditions of proﬁt maximization. In general, our assumptions do not imply that the
monopolist’s objective function is single-peaked.30 Clearly, the monopolist selects the solution
to the ﬁrst-order condition that maximizes his proﬁt. Hence, mM is generically unique.
We can rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition as ϕ(mM)+mMΦ0(mM)=0 ,w h e r eϕ(m) ≡
Φ(m) − c(m). By assumption 1, Φ0(m) > 0 if m<b m,a n dΦ0(m) < 0 if the reverse inequality
holds. Similarly, by assumption 2, ϕ(m) > 0 if m<m ∗,a n dϕ(m) < 0 if the reverse inequality
holds. Consequently, if b m 6= m∗,w eh a v eϕ(m)+mΦ0(m) > 0 for m ≤ min{b m,m∗} and
ϕ(m)+mΦ0(m) < 0 for m ≥ max{b m,m∗}.I f b m = m∗,t h e nϕ(m)+mΦ0(m) > 0 for
m<b m = m∗ and ϕ(m)+mΦ0(m) < 0 for m>b m = m∗.
P r o o fo fl e m m a5 . The constraint in the maximization problem implies that mCI ≤ m∗.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the unconstrained problem may be written as
d[z(mCI)π(mCI)]/dm =0 . (15)
If platform eﬀects are very weak, b m =0 , mCI ≥ b m is trivially satisﬁed. If platform eﬀects are
weak but not very weak, we have b m>0, and the l.h.s. of (15) is strictly positive if evaluated
at any m ≤ b m. Hence, mCI > b m.I fp l a t f o r me ﬀects are strong, b m>m ∗, the constraint in the
maximization problem is necessarily binding, and so mCI = m∗.
P r o o fo fr e m a r k3 . b s(m) satisﬁes
Ψs(m,b s(m)) = zs(m,b s(m))π(m)+
z(m,b s(m)) + b s(m)zs(m,b s(m))
m
=0 . (16)
We show that Ψss(m,b s(m)) < 0. That is, holding m ﬁxed, Ψ(m,s) has at most one extremum,
and this extremum is necessarily a maximum. We have

























30In the CES example, there is a unique solution to the ﬁrst-order condition, provided parameters are such
that assumptions 1 and 2 holds.
29Hence, Ψss(m,b s(m)) < 0. It follows that, for any m, Ψ(m,s) is single-peaked in s.I f b s(m)
exists, it is the unique maximizer of Ψ(m,s).
Existence is guaranteed since, for any m, Ψ is increasing in s for s suﬃciently small and
decreasing in s for s suﬃciently large. We ﬁrst show that Ψ is decreasing in s for s suﬃciently
large. This can be seen as follows. Note that z is strictly decreasing and concave in s. Hence,







Hence, Ψs(m,s(m)) < 0 for any given m. We now show that Ψ is increasing in s for s
suﬃciently small. Fix any m. Then the sum of the ﬁrst two terms on the r.h.s. of the above
equation becomes positive for s<0 suﬃciently small (i.e. large in absolute value) because zs
is negative and π(m)+s/m is also negative. Concerning the third term, for s suﬃciently small
z is positive. Hence, Ψs is positive for s suﬃciently small.
P r o o fo fl e m m a6 . Recall that zs(m,s)=−1/g0(z(m,s)) < 0. We assumed that u0(m) > 0,
and so zm(m,s)=u0(m)/g0(z(m,s)) > 0.W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tg00(z) ≥ 0.T h i si m p l i e st h a t






Ψms(m,b s(m)) = zms(m,b s(m))π(m)+zs(m,b s(m))π0(m)
+
[zm(m,b s(m)) + b s(m)zms(m,b s(m))] −
[z(m,e s(m))+e s(m)zs(m,e s(m))]
m
m
= zms(m,b s(m))π(m)+zs(m,b s(m))π0(m)
+
[zm(m,b s(m)) + b s(m)zms(m,b s(m))] + zs(m,b s(m))π(m)
m
,
where the second equality follows from (16). We have Ψms(m,b s(m)) > 0 if






But this inequality is satisﬁed since zm(m,s) > 0, zs(m,s) < 0, zms(m,s) ≥ 0, π(m)+
mπ0(m) ≤ 0 by assumption, and since from (16),
mπ(m)+b s(m)=−z(m,b s(m))/zs(m,b s(m)) > 0.





where the inequality follows since b s(m) maximizes Ψ(m,s) and Ψms(m,b s(m)) > 0.
30P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6 . Recall that the monopolist’s proﬁt-maximizing platform size e m(s)
satisﬁes
[Ψ(e m(s),s) − c(e m(s))] + e m(s)Ψm(e m(s),s)=0 . (17)
(1) Suppose that platform eﬀects are weak at sO2. Then, b m(sO2) <m ∗(sO2)=mO2.F r o m
the stability condition (12), and since b s0(m) > 0, it follows that, for any s ≥ sO2, b m(s) < b s−1(s).
Hence, the unique intersection of b s(m) and b m(s), (mC2,s C2), is such that sC2 <s O2 and
mC2 <m O2. Since the intersection of m∗(s) and b s(mO2) at (mO2,s O2) is stable, it also follows
that mC2 = b m(sC2) <m ∗(sC2), i.e., the constraint Ψ(mC2,s C2) ≤ c(mC2) is nonbinding.
We will now show that b m(sO2) < e m(sO2) <m ∗(sO2).( i ) N o t e t h a te m(sO2) < b m(sO2)
with Ψ(e m(sO2),s O2) <c (e m(sO2)) cannot be a proﬁt-maximizing solution. To see this, let m0
denote the smallest platform size larger than e m(sO2) such that Ψ(m0,s O2)=c(m0).S i n c e
Ψ(b m(sO2),s O2) >c (b m(sO2)), m0 exists. But then, the monopolist’s proﬁt is larger when
choosing platform size m0 rather than e m(sO2):
m0Ψ(m0,s O2) − C(m0)=m0c(m0) − C(m0)
> e m(sO2)c(e m(sO2)) − C(e m(sO2))
> e m(sO2)Ψ(e m(sO2),s O2) − C(e m(sO2)),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that mc(m) − C(m) is increasing in m since
c0(m) ≥ 0. (ii) Next, note that e m(sO2) < b m(sO2) with Ψ(e m(sO2),s O2) ≥ c(e m(sO2)) cannot be
ap r o ﬁt-maximizing solution either since, in this case, the l.h.s. of (17) is strictly positive. (iii)
For the same reason, e m(sO2) 6= b m(sO2). (iv) Finally, we cannot have e m(sO2) ≥ m∗(sO2) since,
in this case, the l.h.s. of (17) is strictly negative. Hence, b m(sO2) < e m(sO2) <m ∗(sO2).U s i n g
the same steps, one can show that b m(sC2) < e m(sC2) <m ∗(sC2). It follows that e m(sO2) <




e m(sM2)=b s−1(sM2).S i n c eb s0(m) > 0,i tf o l l o w st h a tt h eu n i q u ei n t e r s e c t i o no fe m(s) and b s(m),
(mM2,s M2), is such that b m(sO2) <m M2 = e m(mM2) <m ∗(sO2) and sC2 <s M2 <s O2.
(2) Suppose that platform eﬀects are strong at sO2. Then, b m(sO2) >m ∗(sO2)=mO2.
From our stability condition (12), and since b s0(m) > 0, it follows that, for any s ≤ sO2,
b m(s) > b s−1(s). Hence, the unique intersection of b s(m) and b m(s), (m0,s 0), is such that s0 >s O2
and m0 >m O2. Since the intersection of m∗(s) and b s(mO2) at (mO2,s O2) is stable, it also
follows that m0 = b m(s0) >m ∗(s0), i.e., the constraint Ψ(m0,s 0) ≤ c(m0) is violated. Hence, at
the solution (mC2,s C2), the constraint must be binding, and so mC2 = m∗(sC2)=mO2 and
sC2 = sO2.
We will now show that m∗(sO2) < e m(sO2).( i ) N o t e ﬁrst that e m(sO2) <m ∗(sO2) with
Ψ(e m(sO2),s O2) <c (e m(sO2)) cannot be a proﬁt-maximizing solution. The argument is the
same as under (1), (i), above: the monopolist could increase its proﬁt by choosing the smallest
platform size m0 > e m(sO2) such that Ψ(m0,s O2)=c(m0). (ii) Next, note that e m(sO2) ≤
m∗(sO2) with Ψ(e m(sO2),s O2) ≥ c(e m(sO2)) cannot be a proﬁt-maximizing solution either since,
in this case, the l.h.s. of (17) is strictly positive. Hence, m∗(sO2) < e m(sO2),a n ds oe m(sO2) >
b s−1(sO2). It follows that the unique intersection of e m(s) and b s(m), (mM2,s M2), is such that
mM2 = e m(mM2) >m ∗(sO2) and sM2 = b s(mM2) >s O2 = sC2.
It remains to be shown that there is a positive monotone relationship between m and z.
Note that Ψs(m,s)=zs(m,s)π(m)+[ z(m,s)+szs(m,s)]/m.Since s = u(m) − g(z(m,s)) and
31zs(m,s)=−1/g0(z(m,s)),w ec a nr e w r i t et h eﬁrst-order condition Ψs(m,s)=0as mπ(m)+
u(m) − zg0(z) − g(z)=0 , which determines z as a function of m;d e n o t ei tb ye z(m).W eh a v e
e z0(m)=−
π(m)+mπ0(m)+u0(m)
−2g0(e z(m)) − e z(m)g00(e z(m))
> 0
since π(m)+mπ0(m)+u0(m) > 0 and g00(z) ≥ 0 by assumption. Hence, zω >z ω0
if and only
if mω >m ω0
,w h e r eω,ω0 ∈ {M2,C2,O2}.
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